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How is information integrated across the 
attributes of an option when making risky 
choices? In most descriptive models of 
decision under risk, information about 
risk, and reward is combined multiplica-
tively (e.g., expected value; expected util-
ity theory, Bernouli, 1738/1954; subjective 
expected utility theory, Savage, 1954; 
Edwards, 1955; prospect theory, Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979; rank-dependent util-
ity, Quiggin, 1993; decision field theory, 
Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993; transfer 
of attention exchange model, Birnbaum, 
2008). That is, (some transform of) prob-
ability is multiplied by (some transform of) 
reward to give a value for a risky prospect, 
and the prospect with the maximum value 
is then chosen.
Here I argue that information inte-
gration in risky decision-making may be 
additive. Integration is additive in other 
domains and, if cognitive processes are 
shared, integration may be additive in 
risky choice too. Further, although valua-
tions of risky prospects show multiplicative 
integration of risk and reward, integration 
is additive for judgments of attractiveness 
and, if risky decisions are based on attrac-
tiveness rather than valuation, integration 
in risky choice may be additive. Finally, 
I show that, for simple risky choices, an 
additive model can mimic a multiplicative 
model, and vice versa. Implications for the 
assessment of the stability of risky prefer-
ence are profound – stable parameters in 
the multiplicative model will correspond 
with different stable parameters in the 
additive model and, further, the mode of 
integration itself may vary from time to 
time or context to context.
Judgments of non-risky 
prospects
In a wide variety of decisions that do not 
involve risk, the additive model describes 
people’s valuation of options better than 
the multiplicative model. For example, 
people average across descriptive adjec-
tives when judging the likeability of a 
person (Anderson, 1981). In consumers’ 
decision-making, information is averaged 
over attributes (Troutman and Shanteau, 
1976). Prior expectancies are averaged with 
perceptual experiences in judging the qual-
ity of a wide variety of products (Dougherty 
and Shanteau, 1999). Preferences for sand-
wich and drink lunches involve an additive 
combination of information (Shanteau and 
Anderson, 1969). When pretending to be 
Father Christmas, children combine deserv-
ingness and achievement information addi-
tively to decide what present a child should 
receive (Anderson and Butzin, 1978). To the 
extent that common cognitive processes 
operate in all decisions, the additive model 
may also be operating in decisions involv-
ing risk.
Judgments of risky prospects
Buying prices, selling prices, bids, and 
certainty equivalents are often used to 
value risky options. For example, Tversky 
(1967a,b) had inmates give the minimum 
price for which they would sell an oppor-
tunity to play a simple gambles of the form 
“p chance of x otherwise nothing.” Tversky 
found that there was a p by x interaction 
when predicting price but not logarithm 
of price and thus Tverksy rejected the 
additive model and concluded that his 
data were well described by a subjective 
expected utility model with a power law 
utility function and a subjective prob-
ability function. This finding has been 
replicated with more complicated gam-
bles of the form “p chance of gaining x 
and q chance of loosing y” (Anderson and 
Shanteau, 1970), when risks and rewards 
were presented as verbal phrases (e.g., “a 
somewhat likely chance to win a watch”) 
rather than as numbers (Shanteau, 1974), 
and for strength-of-preference judg-
ments for pairs of gambles (Mellers et al., 
1992a). In contrast, ratings of favorable-
ness, attractiveness, and the likelihood of 
playing are better described by an additive 
model (Sjöberg, 1968; Levin et al., 1985; 
Mellers et al., 1992b; Mellers and Chang, 
1994). Multiplicative integration for valu-
ations and additive integration for attrac-
tiveness has been found within the same 
experiment (e.g., Mellers et al., 1992a; 
Mullet, 1992).
It is not obvious to me whether choices 
will be more closely linked to valuation or 
attractiveness judgments. To the best of my 
knowledge, no one has explicitly compared 
additive models with multiplicative models 
using choice data. It may be that an additive 
model proves successful.
the importance of a complete 
choice model
The information integration process can-
not be considered in isolation from other 
cognitive steps. For example, because the 
logarithmic transform turns summing into 
multiplying [log(a) + log(b) = log(ab)] and 
an exponential transform turns multiplying 
into adding [exp(a) exp(b) = exp(a + b)], 
one must model the possible transforma-
tion of choice attributes into their subjective 
value, the integration of these values, and 
the translation of integrated values into a 
choice. In some circumstances multiplica-
tive and averaging processes are equivalent. 
For example, Massaro and Friedman (1990) 
show that when information is combined 
additively in a perceptron (Rosenblatt, 
1958) as a linear sum of input activations 
and a subsequent sigmoid transform is 
applied, this model is equivalent, for the 
case of two responses, to the (multiplica-
tive) fuzzy logic model (Oden and Massaro, 
1978).
mathematical specification of the 
model
In the following modeling I show that 
a multiplicative and additive model can 
mimic one another. The valence V(pi, 
xi) of a simple risky outcome Gi of the 
form “pi chance of xi otherwise nothing” 
is given by
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log likelihood is −201.308. This means that, 
whatever mode of integration one chooses 
for the model, it can be completely compen-
sated for by varying the degree of determin-
ism in the choice rule. The more additive the 
model, the higher the value of φ needed to 
compensate. This result holds for a purely 
additive base model and a purely multipli-
cative base model. In short, with choices 
between these simple gambles, one cannot 
discriminate between additive and multipli-
cative models of decision under risk.
discussion
This special issue is about the stability, or 
otherwise, of risky preferences across time 
or context. To assess the stability of prefer-
ences, one can identify and fit a model of 
risky choice to data from two or more times 
or contexts and then compare parameters 
across times or contexts (see Zeisberger 
et al., 2011, for a review). Here, I have sug-
gested that information integration in risky 
choice may be additive rather than multi-
plicative. I have shown that, for two-branch 
choices with one non-zero branch, addi-
tive and multiplicative models can mimic 
one another. There are two implications 
of these findings for the stability of risky 
preferences. First, even if some parameter 
value are stable over time, this does not 
mean that correct model has been identi-
fied. Because an additive model can mimic 
a multiplicative model, stable parameters 
from the multiplicative model map on to 
stable—but different—parameters in the 
additive model: the data do not discrimi-
nate between models, and the parameter 
values from a particular model cannot be 
directly interpreted outside of the model. 
Second, even if there is stability in the utility 
and weighting functions (but see Stewart, 
2009, for demonstrations of malleability), 
there may be variation in information inte-
gration over time or context. For example, 
Ordóñez and Benson (1997) find people 
switch integration rules under time pres-
sure, and Mellers et al. (1992b) find that the 
mode of integration depends on the range 
of probabilities used in the question set.
In closing, I note that the ability of addi-
tive and multiplicative models to mimic one 
another offers an explanation for the success 
of the decision by sampling model I have 
proposed elsewhere (Stewart et al., 2006) in 
accounting for risky choice. In the model, 
 otherwise nothing” that can be constructed 
using probabilities .1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9 
and amounts 20, 40, 60, 80, and 100. (In 
modeling, amounts were scaled for conveni-
ence by dividing by 100 so that amounts lay 
on the same interval, roughly, as probabili-
ties.) Raw data take the form of the prob-
ability of choosing Gamble 1 according to 
the base model.
Figure 1 shows how the fit of the model 
to these data varies with the parameter 
choice. Fit is calculated as the likelihood 
that the model could generate the data. 
Obviously the base model which generated 
the data fits best. But other models fit well 
too. The panels in Figure 1 shows the likeli-
hood surfaces as model parameters deviate 
away from the best fit. High points on the 
surface represent good model fits. Figure 1A 
show how such simple choices do not con-
strain the forms of the utility and weighting 
functions very well. The broad flat maxi-
mum on the likelihood surface shows that, 
although γ = 1/2 and β = 2/3 provides the 
best fit, these parameters can vary consid-
erably with only a minimal effect on the 
model fit (see Zeisberger et al., in press). 
This is not of central concern here, but is 
quite often overlooked in modeling deci-
sion-making under risk. Figure 1B show 
how the model fit is affected by switching 
the mode of information integration. As 
w3 = 1 − w1 − w2 (without loss of generality), 
the points in the horizontal plane represent 
all possible mixtures of information inte-
gration. At the leftmost corner of the plot 
where w1 = w2 = 0 and w3 = 1 (i.e., a purely 
multiplicative model) the fit is somewhat 
compromised. The other two corners of the 
surface represent a model where only prob-
ability is weighted or where only amount is 
weighted, and are also similarly badly fit-
ting. But for a ridge in the middle of the 
surface (the area colored red), quite large 
variation in the information integration has 
a small effect. Figure 1C shows the most 
important result. Here, the error surface is 
plotted as a function of φ, the determinism 
parameter in the Luce choice rule, and w3 
[I constrained w1 = w2 = (1 − w3)/2 here]. 
There is a ridge of roughly equal likelihood 
which passes through the base model at 
φ = 1, w3 = 1/3 where the log likelihood 
of the data given the model is −200.972. 
At one end, where w3 = 0 and the model 
is completely additive, the log likelihood is 
−201.060. At the other end, where w3 = 1 and 
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where s(.) is the subjective probability func-
tion and U(.) is the utility function and 
the subscript i indexes different gambles. 
Without loss of generality, I constrain the ws 
to be in the range 0–1 and w1 + w2 + w3 = 1. 
The restricted model with w1 + w2 = 1/2 and 
w3 = 0 is the additive model. The restricted 
model with w1 = w2 = 0 and w3 = 1 is the 
multiplicative model.
To provide a complete model of choice, 
I use Luce’s choice rule to give the prob-
ability of choosing gamble Gi from a set of 
N gambles.
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φ is a free parameter which produces chance 
responding when φ = 0 and increasingly 
deterministic as φ increases. Utility is 
assumed to be a power function of money:
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where γ is a free parameter greater than 
zero. When 0 < γ < 1, the utility function is 
concave. Subjective probability is assumed 
to follow the form suggested by Wu and 
Gonzalez (1996):
sp
p
pp
i
i
ii
()
()
, / =
+− ()
β
ββ β
1
1
 
(4)
where β is a free parameter greater than 
zero. When 0 < β < 1, the subjective prob-
ability function has an inverse-S-shape.
model mimicry
To illustrate how additive and multiplicative 
models can mimic one another, I generated 
data from a base model with γ = 1/2, β = 2/3, 
φ = 1, and w1 = w2 = w3 = 1/3. The exact 
parameter values are not crucial to the argu-
ment. These values are loosely based on the 
well established findings of a concave utility 
function, an inverse-S-shaped probability 
weighting function, and probability match-
ing. These particular w parameters give the 
subjective value of a gamble as the sum of 
the subjective probability, subjective utility, 
and their product.
The choice set used is the set of all pos-
sible choices of the form “p1 chance of x1 
otherwise nothing” or “p2 chance of x2 
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other attributes in memory. Favorable com-
parisons are counted in an accumulator, 
and the prospect whose accumulator gets 
to threshold first is selected. Because, for 
each prospect, favorable comparisons are 
counted in a single accumulator, informa-
tion about how well an amount compares to 
other amounts memory is effectively com-
bined additively with information about 
how well a probability compares to other 
probabilities in memory. For example, the 
subjective value of a simple gamble like a 
“30% chance of winning $100” is effectively 
the proportion of probabilities in memory 
less than 30% (because the target 30% will 
compare favorably to these) plus the pro-
portion of amounts in memory less than 
$100 (because the target $100 will compare 
favorably to these). Despite the decision by 
sampling model combining risk and reward 
information additively, it is able to fit, for 
example, the classic paradoxes in Kahneman 
and Tverksy (1979) prospect theory paper 
(see Stewart and Simpson, 2008; Stewart, 
2009) because it can vary in the degree of 
determinism in responding by altering the 
threshold to which accumulators race. In 
short, psychologically plausible process 
models of risky decision-making need not 
have an explicit multiplicative integration 
of information to provide a good descrip-
tive account.
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